Tom Clark has presented us with a review of Gary Drescher's new book, Good and Real. For those people who attended Drescher's talk at the last Sallon Salon, please note that his book is a lot less opaque than his talk was.

One interesting aspect of his book is his discussion of Newcomb's Problem at its implications for determinism. Drescher links his discussion of Newcomb's Problem with a discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma. In these discussions, Drescher attempts to address some of the apparent paradoxes that flow from the acceptance of a rigorously deterministic worldview, especially concerning the implications that would follow if it were possible to predict human actions to a high degree of accuracy. Drescher attempts to show that these would not undermine determinism. Some readers here may be familiar with Marxist discussions concerning whether or not it is inevitable that capitalism will be succeeded by socialism and then communism. If such predictions can be accepted as accurate then this raises the question as to why anyone who supports socialism should bother undertaking the risks that may be entailed by participating in political struggles for a socialist world. Such risks, after all, my range from possible loss of employment to possible threats to life or limb. If it is inevitable that socialism will triumph, then it would seem irrational to participate in such struggles which might be very risky. But on the other hand, Marxist theory is very clear, that it is only through such struggles that socialism can ever triumph, so it would seem that Marxists are confronted by a Prisoner's-type Dileamma that is rather similar to the ones that Drescher addresses in his book. Many Marxists have attempted to answer this by arguing that we shouldn't take predictions concerning the inevitable triumph of socialism, too literally. In that way they attempt to make room for the role of human agency in the making of history. On the other hand, the analysis of the Newcomb's Problem and the Prisoner's Dilemma that is offered in Drescher's book may offer a different answer. Drescher suggests, as Tom points out in his review ". . . that that it makes sense to act as if your choice had an effect on conditions preceding the choice, even though there’s no causal link between your choice and those conditions. There exists what he calls a subjunctive means-end relation, a non-causal link between action and desired states of affairs. Therefore, Drescher argues, it can be rational to act for the sake of states of affairs that you know already obtain." In other words, even if the future triumph of socialism is inevitable, it would still be rational for people to struggle towards that end, if Drescher is correct.

I guess a commonsensical approach to all this is that we don't know whether socialism and communism will succeed capitalism, but if we want that to be the case, then we should take actions that would make it the case. In a way, *not* being assured of a desired outcome is what makes that outcome more likely in the sense that it spurs effort on our part. Also, seeing the if-then causal connnection between action and outcome naturally motivates effort. In all of this analysis, one sees the deterministic causal links between desire, action, and outcome that explain why we behave as we do. However, Drescher argues there are non-causal, subjunctive links in addition to causal links, and it's these he says form the rational basis for the ethical maxim of the golden rule/categorical imperative. His argument seems rigorous but I don't understand it.

BTW, Gary will be presenting for the Davis Square Philosophy Cafe in October.

Tom Clark writes:

I guess a commonsensical approach to all this is that we don't know whether socialism and communism will succeed capitalism, but if we want that to be the case, then we should take actions that would make it the case. In a way, *not* being assured of a desired outcome is what makes that outcome more likely in the sense that it spurs effort on our part.

It should be noted that even if we suppose that it is not inevitable that socialism and communism will succeed capitalism, that Prisoner's-type Dilemmas would still confront Marxists, since, if it is supposed that it is in the interests of workers to support socialism, nevertheless rational, self-interested, workers might still shy away from participating in the struggles that would be necessary to attain this end, given the risks that might be incurred from participation in these struggles. This is a problem that writers in the Analytic Marxist tradition like Jon Elster, Richard W. Miller, and G.A. Cohen have written about. And of course readers here who are familiar with the application of game theory to the social sciences would recognize the similarities of these writers' analyses with the Mancur Olsen's analysis of the problem of collective action.

Having said this, Drescxher's treatment of Newcomb's Problem might still be of relevance for reasons given in the quote below from Tom Clark.

Also, seeing the if-then causal connnection between action and outcome naturally motivates effort. In all of this analysis, one sees the deterministic causal links between desire, action, and outcome that explain why we behave as we do. However, Drescher argues there are non-causal, subjunctive links in addition to causal links, and it's these he says form the rational basis for the ethical maxim of the golden rule/categorical imperative. His argument seems rigorous but I don't understand it.